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Abstract 
A Constitution is a collection of principles or axioms determining how society should be organised, and a 
description of the ordering of the axioms in terms of their importance and of their invocation. We report 
on an experiment aimed at discovering preferred axioms relating to the distribution of income within 
society. 
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Introduction 
A Constitution is a set of principles which determine the way a country will be governed, and a 
description of the order in which the principles should be invoked. In Social Choice theory the principles 
are referred to as axioms. In designing a Constitution, axioms are chosen on the basis of their general 
appeal and not by their attractiveness in particular applications. This paper is concerned with axioms 
that relate to the distribution of income in some population: we experimentally explore the appeal of a 
small set of frequently quoted axioms as general principles.  In so doing, we discover the axioms that 
‘should’ form the part of a constitution dealing with the distribution of income. Our work is in stark 
contrast to previous experimental studies which have investigated the appeal of axioms in particular 
applications. We explain further after we have described the axioms being investigated and the 
experimental design. 
 
The Axioms 
As this paper is meant to be illustrative rather than definitive, we deliberately select a small set of 
frequently-invoked axioms: Rawls, Dispersion, Transfer, Group Transfer and Lorenz. We double them by 
considering also their reverses. Briefly, they are as follows
4
.  
1. Rawls [2. Reverse Rawls]: “If the poorest [richest] person in distribution 1 has a higher income than 
the poorest [richest] person in distribution 2, then distribution 1 is preferred”. 
                                                           
4
 The experiment was carried out in Italy. The full instructions are obtainable on request, along with an English translation. It 
should be noted that the principles were first expressed succinctly as above, with more detail being given later. In particular: for 
principles 1 and 2 subjects were told that this principle would be implemented lexicographically; for principles 3 and 4 subjects 
were told that the standard deviation would be used as the measure of dispersion; for principles 5 and 6 subjects were told that 
this principle could be implemented several times; for principles 7 and 8 subjects were told that this principle could be 
implemented several times and they were asked to specify the group size(s); for principles 9 and 10 it was spelt out in detail the 
statement of the principles. 
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3. Dispersion [4. Reverse Dispersion]: “The distribution where the dispersion of income is the smallest 
[largest] is preferred.” 
5. Transfer [6. Reverse Transfer]: “The distribution improves if we take €1 from some individual and give 
it to a poorer [richer] individual”. 
7. Group Transfer [8. Reverse Group Transfer]: “The distribution improves if we take €1 from a group of 
individuals and give it to a group of poorer (richer) individuals”. 
9. Lorenz [10. Reverse Lorenz]: “If the n poorest [richest] people in distribution 1 have a greater 
proportion of the total income than the n poorest [richest] people in distribution 2, for all values of n, 
then the distribution improves”.  
 
The Experiment 
In each of 10 sessions of the experiment we had either 10 (Treatment 1) or 11 (Treatment 2) subjects.  
Subjects were told that the purpose of the experiment was to decide the distribution of 
income/payments of €150 over 10 people, these being the members of a mini-society composed of the 
10 subjects in the experimental session in Treatment 1 and of 10 of the 11 subjects in Treatment 2. The 
11
th
 in Treatment 2, chosen at random at the end of the experiment, would be the Social Planner, whose 
preferences over the axioms would determine the distribution, and who would receive a fixed payment 
of €15 for his or her participation. In Treatment 1 one of the 10 subjects, similarly chosen at random at 
the end of the experiment, would be the Social Planner. Given a chosen distribution, the actual 
distribution over the 10 members of society would be chosen at random, and the resulting incomes 
would be the experimental payment to the subjects. 
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The actual distribution was selected from a set of 100 distributions generated randomly, all with the 
same mean, €15, and with all incomes between €0 and €30. All subjects were aware of this process, but 
were not informed about the actual values of the 100 distributions until the end of the experiment. At 
that point the 100 distributions were shown to all participants, along with the set of preferred 
distributions implied by the Social Planner’s implemented axioms. In the experiment, all such sets 
consisted of a singleton
5
.  
The purpose of the experiment was to establish the preferred principles/axioms, and hence to simulate 
the invocation of a Constitution. Any Constitution should be robust enough to choose from a set of 
possible distributions. We chose 100 as being a sufficiently large number without being excessively 
large
6
.   
Our experiment is fundamentally different from previous experiments on the axioms underlying the 
distribution of income. We refer to the work of Amiel and Cowell, the leaders in this field, summarised 
well in their 1999 book. They report on two kinds of experiment: one (which they call ‘numerical’) — 
often though not always with appropriate financial incentives — in which subjects are asked to make a 
series of pairwise choices between specific distributions; and the second (which they call ‘verbal’) — 
invariably not financially motivated — in which subjects are asked whether they agree with certain 
axioms. We note that with the first type there are two problems: first, it is often not clear which axiom is 
being tested
7
; second, it is not clear from an answer that if a subject prefers the distribution favoured by 
axiom x whether this means that the subject always likes axiom x; contrariwise, it is not clear from an 
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 If it had not, one of the distributions would have been chosen at random; subjects were told this in the 
Instructions. 
6
 Note that, had we specified an infinite number, subjects could have worked out, for example, that one of the 
possible distributions would be completely equal (€15 for all) and another would be completely unequal (€150 for 
one and €0 for everyone else). So, once again they would be back to choosing between specific distributions rather 
than deciding general principles. 
7
 One example, taken from Amiel and Cowell (1999) is a choice between (1, 4, 7, 10, 13) and (1, 5, 6, 10, 13). Is this 
a test of the Transfer Principle, or of Dispersion or indeed of Rawls? 
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answer that if a subject prefers the distribution not favoured by axiom x whether this means that the 
subject never likes axiom x, or whether the specific example is simply an exception. With the second 
type of question there is not only the problem of the lack of a financial incentive; the question is not 
even set in the context of constitutional choice over income distributions. In our experiment, in contrast, 
this was crucially the focus of the experiment. 
Before turning to our results, we ought to make some further observations on the axioms we chose to 
include in our experiment. First, we should admit that axiom 7 (and its reverse) could be internally 
contradictory – depending upon the distributions in the set. Our software would not allow the axiom to 
be decisive in such a case. Second, we note that any of axioms 3, 5, 7 and 9 obviously are in conflict with 
their reverses, though that is not the case for axiom 1 and its reverse
8
. Third, we note that axioms 1, 2, 
3, and 4 always imply a unique distribution (from any finitely-sized set) while the others do not. Fourth, 
we note that axioms 5 and 9 (and 6 and 10) are identical – differing only in the words used to describe 
them. 
 
Experimental Results 
Subjects were first asked to state which axioms they agreed with. They were then asked which agreed-
to principles they wanted to implement. The software then tried to implement these principles on the 
100 distributions or on the distributions remaining at that stage from the 100. If there was a conflict, the 
software told the subject so and asked him or her to select a different set of axioms to implement. If 
there was no conflict, but a unique distribution did not result from the implementation of the axioms, 
subjects were asked to specify more agreed-to axioms to implement. This process continued until a 
unique distribution resulted
9
. We present a synthesis of our results in two tables. Table 1 gives a 
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 Consider distributions (2,3,10) and (1,5,9). Both 1 and 2 prefer the first. 
9
 Or until no agreed-to principles remained (though this never happened). 
6 
 
summary of the agreed-to principles. Table 2 shows the principles implemented in the order in which 
they were implemented. If a subject implemented more than one principle at the same time, we record 
this by putting the principles’ numbers in parenthesis.  
As far as Table 1
10
, which tabulates the rate of agreement with principles, is concerned, it seems that 
differences between the treatments are minor. Over both treatments there is more (64% against 36%) 
agreement with for what one might call egalitarian principles (numbers 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9) as distinct from 
anti-egalitarian principles (2, 4, 6, 8 and 10).   
In Table 2 again there do not seem to be major differences between the two treatments. We note 
however, a rather large number of instances in which subjects invoked sequentially a mixture of 
egalitarian and anti-egalitarian principles. We also note that this practice was considerably more 
prevalent in Treatment 1 (where the subject was going to be a member of society). This seems to 
illustrate well a tension between the social intentions of the subjects and their self-interest. The four 
most frequently implemented principles were dispersion, Rawls, reverse dispersion and reverse Rawls. 
The over-riding popularity of these four decisive principles is noteworthy, suggesting that decisiveness is 
an important property of a constitution.  Overall a decisive principal was implemented first 60% of the 
time. 
 
Conclusions 
The main objective of this experiment was illustrative: to show that it is possible to elicit directly and 
with appropriate incentives the principles that people feel should be in the part of a Constitution 
determining the distribution of income in society. We make no claim to representativeness in our 
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 We note that subjects repeated the experiment three times; the results below are based on aggregate results 
(there were very few differences between the three repetitions and hence very little evidence of learning). 
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subject pool, and indeed one of our next objectives is to run the experiment on a larger and more 
representative sample and collect demographic information. However, our objective is wider; we intend 
to enlarge the set of axioms under consideration, extending them to include considerations of Fairness, 
Responsibility and Welfare (to steal from the title of Fleurbaey (2008)). One crucial point is that of 
discovering how people choose between apparently conflicting axioms.  We have already noted in 
Treatment 1 a tension between the social intentions of the subjects and their self-interest. More 
generally subjects seem to be happy to invoke simultaneously-conflicting principles sequentially; that is, 
an individual might apply the transfer principle first of all to reduce the set of possible distributions, and 
then apply reverse Rawls to select a unique distribution from the reduced set. Such a sequential, rather 
than simultaneous, invocation of principles is a possibility that theorists might like to consider. 
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Table 1 
Axiom Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
1 Rawls 121 135 
2 Reverse Rawls 98 94 
3 Dispersion 79 101 
4 Reverse Dispersion 76 59 
5 Transfer 92 95 
6 Reverse Transfer 20 26 
7 Group Transfer 95 105 
8 Reverse Group Transfer 25 21 
9 Lorenz 121 123 
10 Reverse Lorenz 103 81 
Totals 830 837 
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Table 2: Order of Implementation of the axioms 
Treatment 1 – total number of times is 150 Treatment 2 – total number of times is 165 
Cumulative Number of times Axioms and order Cumulative Number of times Axioms and order 
18%   27  3 25%   42  3 
 35%   26  4  41%   26  1 
 52%   25  1  53%   20  4 
 59%   11  2  61%   13  2 
 63%    6 10  2  65%    6 10  3 ! 
 67%    5  7**  68%    5  7 ** 
 69%    4  9  1  70%    4 10  2 
 71%    3  9  3  72%    3  7  1 
 73%    3 (1  7)  74%    3  (5  9)  1 
 75%    3  5**  76%    3  (1  3)* 
 77%    2 10  1  77%    2  9  1 
 78%    2  9  4 !  78%    2  5** 
 79%    2  7  3  79%    2 10  1 
 81%    2  8**  81%    2 10  4 
 81%    1  7  (1  4) * !  82%    2  5  7 
 82%    1 10  5  7  9  1 !  83%    2  7  9  1 
 83%    1 10  9  7  5  2 !  84%    2 10  8  2 
 83%    1  9  7  3  85%    1  9 
 84%    1  8 10  1 !  85%    1  7  9  3 
 85%    1 10  4  86%    1  5  9  2 ! 
 85%    1  8  1  87%    1  (3  5) 
 86%    1  5  7  3  87%    1  9  4 
 87%    1  7  1  88%    1  (3  5  7)* 
 87%    1  5  3  88%    1  5  3 
 88%    1 10  3  89%    1  5  1 
 89%    1  2  4*  90%    1  8  4 
 89%    1  7  4 !  90%    1  (1  7) 
 90%    1 10  6  8  3 !  91%    1  7  3 
 91%    1  8  3 !  92%    1  7  5  3 
 91%    1  9  7  5  3  92%    1  9  2 
 92%    1  9 10  3 !  93%    1  8  3 ! 
 93%    1  7  5  3  9  1 ^  93%    1  7  9  6  1 ! 
 93%    1  7  5  3  94%    1  6  1 
 94%    1  5  1  95%    1  6  3 
 95%    1 10  9  5  3 !  95%    1  8  6  4 
 95%    1  8  4  96%    1  9  5  7  1 
 96%    1 10  3  2 ^  96%    1  9  7  1 
 97%    1 (6 10)  4  97%    1  (5  7)  4 
 97%    1 (7  9) 1  98%    1  9  (1  3) 
 98%    1  9  98%    1  7  5  9 10  3 
 99%    1  9 10  2 !  99%    1  3  7 
 99%    1 10  7  4 !  99%    1  9  3 
100%    1  7  9 10  5  2 ! 100%    1  7  9  1  3 
(x,y,z) indicates that x, y and z were implemented simultaneously. 
*Note that while certain axioms may sometimes be in conflict, there may be cases where the distributions are such that there is 
no de facto conflict. 
** Note that while certain axioms are not decisive there may be cases of sets of distributions for which such axioms are de facto 
decisive 
! These indicate a mix of egalitarian- and anti-egalitarian principles. 
^While axiom 3 in general is decisive, in this case just 2 distributions remained both with exactly the same standard deviation.  
